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  Last September, Congress passed the Food and Drug Administration 
Amendments Act of 2007.  Title III of that law, the Pediatric Medical Safety and 
Improvement Act, created new incentives, mandates, FDA authority, and funding with 
the aim of increasing the availability of devices for pediatric populations while assuring 
the safety and effectiveness of those devices. The purpose of this article is to situate this 
new law within the context of the problem it addresses, the general approach of medical 
device regulation in the United States, the complex problem the Title addresses, the 
regulatory solutions to the parallel problem for pediatric drugs, and stakeholder input. 
In Part I, I will briefly discuss the history of the regulation of medical devices in 
the United States and the current general regulatory scheme for devices.  In Part II, I will 
describe first the market failures that have resulted in the development of few medical 
devices intended for use in children.  Second, I will discuss the ways Congress and the 
Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) addressed the analogous problem in the drug 
context.  Third, I will describe the ways Congress and FDA dealt with the problem in 
devices before the most recent legislation.  In Part III, I will report stakeholder comments 
on the specific problems in the device arena that remained despite regulatory activity, 
including unmet needs, barriers, and their recommended solutions.  In Part IV, I will 
briefly discuss FDA’s subsequent report to Congress, the Institute of Medicine’s report 
on problems and solutions regarding post-marketing surveillance of medical devices used 
in pediatric populations, and the Medical Device Innovation Initiative.   Finally, in Part 
V, I will discuss the Pediatric Medical Device Safety and Improvement Act.  First, I will 
recount briefly the Act’s legislative history.  Second, I will describe the Title’s new 
mechanisms for increasing availability of pediatric devices.  Third, I will conclude by   3 
relating those mechanisms to the public comments, the Institute of Medicine’s report, the 
goals of Congress, and the current regulatory scheme for encouraging the development of 
pediatric drugs. 
 
PART I 
1.  History of the Regulation of Medical Devices 
Regulation of medical devices has always lagged behind regulation of drugs.
1  
While Congress authorized the national regulation of drugs in 1906, it did not provide for 
the regulation of devices until 1938.
2  Before 1938, government oversight of medical 
devices was left to the United States Post Office, which used its authority under mail 
fraud statutes to prosecute fraudulent medical device claims sent through the United 
States mail.
3  When Congress strengthened the regulatory scheme for drugs in 1962, 
requiring premarket approval of each new drug for safety and effectiveness, medical 
devices were left to be governed by the pre-existing scheme.
4  It was not until the 
Medical Device Amendments of 1976 that Congress gave FDA broad authority to 
regulate the safety and effectiveness of medical devices.
5  Because the regulation of drugs 
and medical devices was contemplated separately, the resulting regulatory structure 
differs between the two.   
2.  The Current Regulatory Framework 
                                                 
1 See Peter Barton Hutt,  A History of Government Regulation of Adulteration and 
Misbranding of Medical Devices,  44 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 99 (1989).   
2 Id. at 104. 
3 Id. at 101. 
4 Id. at 106. 
5 Id. at 112.   4 
Medical devices are diverse, from tongue depressors to artificial hearts to in vitro 
diagnostics.
6   This range, in complexity, novelty, safety risk, and potential for benefit, is 
reflected in the FDA’s regulation of medical devices. While nearly all new drugs must go 
through the same rigorous premarket approval process, new medical devices undergo 
different premarket processes depending on the risk to patients of their use or misuse.
7  
Since the 1976 Medical Device Amendments, FDA has regulated medical devices 
through this risk-based classification system.  The riskier the device, the more oversight 
FDA extends.   
(a)  Class I 
Class I devices, like tongue depressors, pose the least amount of risk and are 
subject to the lowest degree of regulatory control.
8  Class I devices regulated through five 
“general controls:”  (1) registration of entities involved in producing and distributing the 
device;
9 (2) listing the medical device with FDA;
10 (3) labeling the device with the name 
                                                 
6 FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., IS THE PRODUCT A MEDICAL DEVICE?, Feb. 28, 2002, 
http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/devadvice/312.html.  A medical device is defined as, “an 
instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant, in vitro reagent, or 
other similar or related article, including a component part, or accessory which is: 
recognized in the official National Formulary, or the United States Pharmacopoeia, or 
any supplement to them; intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, 
or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, in man or other animals, or; 
intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of man or other animals, and 
which does not achieve any of it's primary intended purposes through chemical action 
within or on the body of man or other animals and which is not dependent upon being 
metabolized for the achievement of any of its primary intended purposes.”  Id., quoting 
Federal Food Drug & Cosmetic Act § 201(h), 21 USC 321(h). 
7 FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 6. 
8 FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DEVICE CLASSES, Nov. 21, 2002, 
http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/devadvice/3132.html. 
9 Id. 
10 Id.   5 
and place of business, intended use, and adequate directions for use;
11 (4) complying with 
good manufacturing practices as outlined by FDA regulation;
12 and (5) submission of 
premarket notification demonstrating that the device is substantially equivalent to, 
meaning at least as safe and effective as, a device already legally marketed.
13   However, 
because of the low risk of Class I devices, most are exempt from one or both of the fourth 
and fifth requirements.
14 
(b)  Class II 
Class II devices, such as infusion pumps and power wheelchairs, carry more risk.  
FDA subjects most Class II devices to all general controls and a few “special controls,” 
which may include additional labeling requirements, performance standards, and 
postmarket surveillance.
15  In keeping with the agency’s flexible approach to regulating 
devices, the special controls FDA requires depend on the nature of the device;
16 a few 
Class II devices are even exempt from premarket notification of substantial 
equivalence.
17 
(c)  Class III 
                                                 
11 FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., LABELING REQUIREMENTS – GENERAL, Feb. 9, 2000, 
http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/devadvice/331.html. 
12 FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GOOD MANUFACTURING PRACTICES (GMP) / QUALITY SYSTEM 
(QS) REGULATION, Jan. 28, 2004,  http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/devadvice/32.html. 
13 FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PREMARKET NOTIFICATION 510(K), Nov. 1, 2006, 
http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/devadvice/314.html.  
14 FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 8. 
15 Id. 
16 E.g., FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., POSTMARKET SURVEILLANCE STUDIES, Aug. 29, 2007, 
http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/devadvice/352.html#who.  
17 FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., MEDICAL DEVICE EXEMPTIONS 510(K) AND GMP 
REQUIREMENTS, May 6, 2008, 
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfpcd/315.cfm.   6 
Class III devices, which include replacement heart valves and silicone breast 
implants, have the most potential for harm.  They are “usually those that support or 
sustain human life, are of substantial importance in preventing impairment of human 
health, or which present a potential, unreasonable risk of illness or injury.”
18  Class III 
devices are generally subject to premarket approval, involving rigorous scientific 
assessment of the safety and effectiveness of the device for its intended use.  However, in 
certain circumstances, even Class III devices can forgo the premarket approval process 
for the less intensive premarket notification.
19 
 
PART II 
  Both drug and device manufacturers are largely for-profit entities.  Their ability to 
remain financially solvent depends largely on their ability to sell enough of their products 
at enough of a profit to support their business expenses, including research and 
development.  As a result, when a disease population is too small, a condition too rare, 
market forces alone do not provide adequate incentive for manufacturers to develop 
therapeutic and diagnostic tools for those populations.   
Children in need of medical products can be seen as a special case of the small 
market problem.  Not only are there fewer children than adults generally, but children 
who need drugs and medical devices are even more rare.  For example, heart disease is 
relatively common in adults, but congenital heart defects are very rare in children and 
                                                 
18 FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 6. 
19 Because of an interesting historical compromise, Class III devices may gain market 
clearance through premarket notification only if the devices are substantially equivalent 
to Class III devices on the market before 1976.  Id.   7 
defects can vary considerably from child to child.
20  Moreover, because of differences in 
size, growth rate, metabolism, heart rate, activity level, and other biochemical 
differences, the drug, dosage, or device an infant needs is not the same as a 10-year-old, 
even if they have the same ailment.  Thus, the pediatric market is more properly viewed 
as several submarkets, from neonatal to young adult, each potentially needing its own 
specialized device.  The small market size not only reduces the potential sales of drugs or 
devices that could be sold; it also makes clinical trials more difficult to perform.  
Pediatric medical researchers express frustration with the amount of time, energy, and 
financial resources required to enroll the number of pediatric patients in a clinical trial to 
test a device according to FDA’s specifications.  Because drugs and devices may be used, 
through not marketed, off-label, there is an overwhelming incentive to conduct trials in 
one population, write the label accordingly, and leave it to clinicians to prescribe it in 
other populations.   
As a result, “for children, off-label use is the rule, not the exception.”
 21  For 
drugs, this means “dosing down”
22 a medication only tested in, and approve for, adult 
populations.  Almost two-thirds of drugs prescribed for children are not labeled for their 
population;
23 nearly 80% of hospitalized children are given at least one drug for off-label 
                                                 
20 Mullins, infra note 117, at 2. 
21 Ensuring Safe Medicines and Medical Devices for Children, Senate Committee on 
Health, Education, Labor, & Pensions, 107
th Cong. (2007) (testimony of Richard L. 
Gorman, MD, FAAP on behalf of the American Academy of Pediatrics), citing  
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PEDIATRIC DRUG RESEARCH, 
GAO-07-557. 
22 This common phrase can be seen, e.g., in Joanna K. Sax, Reforming FDA Policy for 
Pediatric Testing: Challenges and Changes in the Wake of Studies Using Antidepressant 
Drugs, 4 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 61 (2007). 
23 Gorman, supra note 21.   8 
use.
24  For devices, this means “jury-rigging” an adult device, attempting to physically 
modify it to fit a child’s body and lifestyle.
 25  However, there is little information, aside 
from anecdotes, to guide clinicians in these endeavors.  Moreover, because children are 
not simply small adults, “dosing down” and “jury-rigging” are not always viable options.  
For example, children’s baseline respiratory rates are more rapid than adults, making 
artificial heart valves designed for adults unusable in children.
 26 
Thus, there are two main problems created by market failures in the pediatric drug 
and device arenas:  (1) the dearth of drugs and devices specifically designed for pediatric 
populations, and (2) the lack of information on the appropriate pediatric use of drugs, 
through dosing, and devices, through physical modification.  The next sections will show 
how Congress and FDA attempted to solve each of those problems. 
 
1. The Drug Context 
  (a)  The Orphan Drug Act and the Rare Diseases Act 
In 1983, Congress began to tackle the first of these problems in the drug arena 
through the Orphan Drug Act.  Congress has amended the Orphan Drug Act several times 
since, attempting to better tailor the incentives it provides to the statute’s purpose of 
                                                 
24 Id., citing Shah SS, Sharma VS, Jenkins KJ, Levin JE, Off-label Drug Use in 
Hospitalized Children, 161 ARCHIVES OF PEDIATRIC & ADOLESCENT MED., 282-290 
(2007). 
25 Programs Affecting Safety and Innovation in Pediatric Therapies:  Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Health, 110
th Cong. (2007) (testimony of  Diane Edquist Dorman Vice 
President of the National Organization for Rare Disorders), 1-19, 2.  
26 AM. PEDIATRIC SOC’Y & SOC’Y FOR PEDIATRIC RES., PEDIATRIC MEDICAL DEVICES:  
COMMENTS TO THE IOM, Aug. 23, 2004, http://www.aps-
spr.org/Public_Policy/2004_Docs/CommentIOM20040823.htm.   9 
making drugs available to Americans suffering from rare disorders.
27  In 2002, Congress 
supplemented these efforts with the Rare Diseases Act, which further supported research 
on diseases with small patient populations.
 28  While these two statutes are not aimed 
specifically at pediatric populations, they have provided incentives and support for the 
development of pediatric drugs. 
The Orphan Drug Act defines an “orphan drug” as either a drug
29 for a condition 
affecting fewer than 200,000 people in the United States, or one that would cost more to 
develop and make available than would be recovered from sales in the United States.
30  
The Orphan Drug Act and the Rare Diseases Act, together, created a comprehensive 
scheme to promote the development of orphan drugs, through:  (1) seven years market 
exclusivity; (2) a fifty percent tax credit for “qualifying clinical testing expenses,” 
including the human trials necessary to gain FDA approval; (3) the appropriation of grant 
funds for orphan drug research and clinical trials; and (4) assistance from FDA in 
designing the appropriate clinical trials.  In addition, FDA used its authority granted by 
the Orphan Drug Act to encourage drug sponsors to use open clinical trial protocols to 
                                                 
27 See Gary A. Pulsinelli, The Orphan Drug Act: What’s Right With It, 15 SANTA CLARA 
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L. J. 299, 307-309 (1999). 
28 See Carl Rados, Orphan Products: Hope for People With Rare Diseases, FDA 
CONSUMER MAG., Nov.-Dec. 2003, 
http://www.fda.gov/fdac/features/2003/603_orphan.html.  
29 As defined in Federal Food Drug, & Cosmetic Act § 201(g), 21 U.S.C. § 321 (2004). 
30 FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DEFINITION OF DISEASE PREVALENCE FOR THERAPIES 
QUALIFYING UNDER THE ORPHAN DRUG ACT, 
http://www.fda.gov/orphan/designat/prevalence.html (last visited, May 10, 2008).  The 
second prong most closely maps onto the market problem Congress was aiming to 
address; indeed, the prevalence prong was not part of the original statute.  The definition 
of “orphan drug” was expanded to include prevalence in the 1983 amendments, largely 
because the pharmaceutical response to the original Orphan Drug Act’s incentives was 
underwhelming. Gary A. Pulsinelli, The Orphan Drug Act:  What’s Right With It, 15 
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L. J. 299, 307 (1999).   10 
increase the availability of the drugs while still in the trial stage, and it established an 
Office of Orphan Product Development.  The Rare Diseases Act subsequently established 
the Office of Rare Diseases within the National Institutes of Health (“NIH”).  Altogether, 
the result is a regulatory scheme that aims to coordinate and support the research, 
development, and production of drugs for rare diseases.
31 
(b)  The 1997 Food & Drug Administration Modernization Act 
Still, the Orphan Drug Act and the Rare Diseases Act were not specifically aimed 
at solving the pediatric problems.  The 1997 Food and Drug Administration 
Modernization Act (“The 1997 Act”) included the first incentives specific to research in 
pediatric populations.  The 1997 Act began to address the lack of information about 
appropriate pediatric use of drugs marketed for adults, through offering drug sponsors six 
months of additional market exclusivity for voluntarily conducting pediatric studies that 
“fairly respond” to drug-specific FDA written requests for pediatric testing.
32  As a result, 
over 125 products have adopted labeling addressing dosage, safety, and efficacy in 
children.
33  FDA estimated that the information gained through the pediatric exclusivity 
incentive, in addition to improving children’s lives, would save several million dollars 
per year, by reducing pediatric hospitalizations alone.
34  Heralded as “the most successful 
                                                 
31 Rados, supra note 27. 
32 Written requests can originate in two ways.  First, FDA can independently determine, 
through background research and review of the literature, that there is a public health 
need for a particular pediatric study to be conducted.  Second, manufacturers can submit 
a proposal for a pediatric study, and FDA may consider that as a starting point for a 
written request if it believes the study presented in the proposal satisfies a public health 
need.  See supra note 2. 
33 Id. 
34 FOOD & DRUG ADMIN, infra note 43.   11 
pediatric initiative that [FDA] has participated in to date,”
35 the exclusivity incentive of 
the 1997 Act was reauthorized in the Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act (“BPCA”) of 
2002.   
However, the incentive was far from perfect.  First, it was both over- and 
underinclusive. The additional market exclusivity did not provide sufficient incentive to 
conduct pediatric clinical trials when the costs of the additional testing overwhelm the 
profits the additional period of exclusivity can provide.  In other words, when a market is 
too small, six months of sales cannot financially support the investment of pediatric 
testing.
36  Conversely, the costs of pediatric studies could seem disproportionately small 
compared to the economic gains of the additional market exclusivity.  This was 
particularly true with drugs that are widely used in adult populations; by undergoing the 
pediatric studies requested by FDA, manufacturers can hold off generic competition in 
the adult market while generating better information about pediatric use.  A group of 
researchers in the Netherlands studying the impact of the pediatric exclusivity provision 
in the United States found that “[t]he distribution of [drugs granted pediatric exclusivity] 
closely matched the distribution of these drugs over the adult market, and not the drug 
utilization by children.”
 37  Indeed, pediatric exclusivity was most frequently granted to 
                                                 
35 Hearing on Programs Affecting Safety and Innovation in Pediatric Therapies:  Health 
Subcommittee of the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the U.S. House of 
Representatives, 110
th Cong. (2007) (statement of Rear Admiral Sandra Lynn Kweder, 
M.D.), available at http://www.fda.gov/ola/2007/peds052207.html. 
36 FOOD & DRUG ADMIN, supra note 44, at 13. 
37 Programs Affecting Safety and Innovation in Pediatric Therapies:  Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Health, 110
th Cong. (2007) (testimony of Peter Lurie, Deputy Director of 
Public Citizen’s Health Research Group, available at 
http://www.citizen.org/publications/release/cfm?ID=7522, citing Boots I, Sukhai RN, 
Klein RH, et al. Stimulation programs for pediatric drug research – do children really 
benefit?, EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PEDIATRICS, Jan. 17, 2007. “The top three drug   12 
drugs for depression and mood disorders, hypertension, elevated cholesterol, HIV, and 
pain – conditions that are common in adults.
38 
At the time of the BCPA hearings in 2001, profits from the additional six months 
of market exclusivity could be several hundred million dollars or more, depending on the 
popularity of the drug in both the pediatric and the adult populations, while the costs to 
pharmaceutical companies of the pediatric studies requested by FDA were between one 
and seven million dollars.
39  This “windfall” to pharmaceutical manufacturers came at the 
expense of postponed generic competition,
40 which FDA estimated at a cost of $13.9 
billion over twenty years.
41  This concern continued to be voiced through the 2007 
hearings to reauthorize the BCPA.
42 
Second, the exclusivity provision did not provide incentives to conduct pediatric 
research on drugs that no longer have patent protection or market exclusivity, such as 
older drugs already off-patent.  For example, the pediatric exclusivity provision could not 
induce pediatric study of Albuterol inhalation solution, an off-patent drug prescribed for 
                                                                                                                                                
categories granted pediatric exclusivity precisely matched (in category and sequence) the 
top three prescribing categories for adults, while none of the top three prescribing 
categories for children appeared in the top three for the granting of pediatric exclusivity.” 
Id. 
38 Id. 
39 See, e.g., Rachel Zimmerman, Child Play: Pharmaceutical Firms Win Big on Plan to 
Test Adult Drugs on Kids, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 2001, at A1. 
40 E.g., Hearings on Evaluating the Effectiveness of the FDA Modernization Act, 107th 
Cong. 71–75 (2001) (testimony of Carole Ben-Maimon, President and CEO, Proprietary 
Research and Development, Barr Laboratories).  
41 FOOD & DRUG ADMIN, infra note 43. 
42 E.g., Programs Affecting Safety and Innovation in Pediatric Therapies:  Hearings 
Before the Subcomm. on Health, 110
th Cong. (2007) (testimony of Chairman Frank 
Pallone, Jr.), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/Subcommittees/HE-
Pallone/pallone_statement_rxdrugs_BPCA_PREA.pdf.   13 
asthma to over 1.6 million patients under the age of 12.
43  Predictably, of the ten drugs 
most commonly prescribed to children, the six without market exclusivity had yet to be 
studied under the pediatric exclusivity program.
44   
Third, the exclusivity program did not induce pediatric studies in the most 
vulnerable pediatric populations, particularly in the neonatal population.  While pediatric 
research is generally more technically and ethically challenging than research in adults, 
research in neonatal populations is particularly hairy. In addition, safety concerns dictate 
that research in the neonatal population occur after research in older children.  As a 
result, manufacturers that received the extra six months for the research in older pediatric 
groups had little incentive to undertake the additional testing.
45 
Lastly, because the 1997 Act did not require pharmaceutical manufacturers to 
change their labeling in order to receive the additional market exclusivity, critics argued 
there was not sufficient incentive for manufacturers to actually disseminate the 
information learned by the pediatric studies.  According to the United States General 
Accounting Office, it took manufacturers nine months on average, three months longer 
than the exclusivity extension, to agree upon a labeling change with FDA.  At times, 
FDA found it particularly difficult to move manufacturers to disclose “unfavorable” 
                                                 
43 FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., THE PEDIATRIC EXCLUSIVITY PROVISION:  JANUARY 2001 
STATUS REPORT TO CONGRESS (2001), at 37. 
44 These included Albuterol; Ampicillin injection, prescribed 639,000 times to patients 
under the age of 12 for infection; and Ritalin, prescribed 226,000 times to patients under 
the age of 6.  All prescription prevalence figures are from 1994.  Id. 
45 It should be mentioned that the 1997 Act did create the possibility for a second period 
of exclusivity to deal with this problem.  However, according to FDA, “it is very limited 
in scope and to date [January 2001] no sponsor has utilized this option.” FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., supra note 44, at iii.   14 
results on drug labels.
46   
In sum, the market exclusivity incentive is systematically biased toward newer, 
on-patent drugs with large non-pediatric markets.  And, without a link between 
exclusivity and labeling, there is little incentive for pharmaceutical companies to 
disseminate unfavorable information uncovered during pediatric testing.  In other words, 
the incentive does not directly align with the goal of generating information on those 
drugs most utilized by children and making that information available to their health care 
providers. 
(c)  The Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act of 2002 
The BPCA addressed some, though not all, of these issues.  Generally, it added 
new mechanisms for further research and development of pediatric drugs and 
dissemination of information regarding the safety and efficacy of drugs used in the 
pediatric population.  First, it required FDA and NIH to generate a prioritized list of 
drugs whose safety and effectiveness in pediatric populations should be assessed.  This 
list includes drugs that are off-patent and without market exclusivity
47 in addition to new 
drugs.
48  If a sponsor of a drug on the list declines to conduct the additional studies, FDA 
can then request contract proposals from third parties, including universities, federally 
funded programs, and even individuals.
49  
                                                 
46 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PEDIATRIC DRUG RESEARCH:  SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE 
IN STUDIES OF DRUGS FOR CHILDREN, BUT SOME CHALLENGES REMAIN (2001) (testimony 
of Janet Heinrich), at 10. 
47 The 1997 Act required FDA to develop a similar list, which the agency generated in 
1998.  But without the ability to enroll third parties to conduct studies drug sponsors, 
most off-patent drugs on this list were not studied.  Supra note 2. 
48 I.e., those drugs approved through the application process described in section 505(j) of 
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.  42 U.S.C. § 284m(a). 
49 42 U.S.C. § 284m(b)-(c).   15 
Second, the BPCA outlined a process for assuring the timely dissemination of 
information, both for drugs on the list described in the previous paragraph and other new 
drugs that “the Secretary determines…information relating to [its] use…in the pediatric 
population may produce health benefits in that population.”
50  Data generated pursuant to 
the Act must be submitted in the form of a report to NIH and FDA, and that report will be 
publicly available.
51   The BPCA also dictated a timeline for negotiating labeling changes 
and resolving any related disputes, giving FDA’s authority here more of a bite.  If 
manufacturers refuse to adopt the final set of recommended labeling changes for a 
particular drug, the FDA may deem that drug misbranded and commence enforcement 
actions accordingly.
52 
Third, the BCPA gave a nod to the problem of little research in the neonatal 
population, by explicitly naming “neonates” as a pediatric age group.
53  However, this 
acknowledgement was of minimal impact, since neonatal research still had to come after 
research in older pediatric populations, and it was still the case that only one clinical 
investigation in pediatric populations was required to gain the additional exclusivity. 
Fourth, the BCPA established several structural mechanisms for coordination 
between industry and government and to assist the implementation of the Act.  It created 
a private, non-governmental Foundation of Pediatric Research at the NIH to enhance 
collaboration efforts among researchers in academia, industry, and non-profits.  Among 
other tasks, the Foundation is to assist the funding of pediatric studies for drugs on the 
                                                 
50 21 U.S.C. § 355a(b).  
51 42 U.S.C. § 284m(c); 21 U.S.C. § 355a(j). 
52 42 U.S.C. § 284m(c); 21 U.S.C. § 355a(i). 
53 21 U.S.C. § 355a.    16 
FDA/NIH prioritized list.
54  It also set up two new government entities within the FDA, 
the Office of Pediatric Therapeutics and the Pediatric Advisory Committee.  The Office 
of Pediatric Therapeutics is the pediatric hub within the Office of the Commissioner at 
the FDA.  It is “responsible for coordination and facilitation of all activities of the Food 
and Drug Administration that may have any effect on a pediatric population or the 
practice of pediatrics or in an other way involve pediatric issues.”
55  Among other tasks, 
the Office for Pediatric Therapeutics houses the Pediatric Advisory Committee.
56  The 
Pediatric Advisory Committee advises FDA on pediatric research, priorities in pediatric 
therapeutics, and pediatric research ethics.
57  For example, the Pediatric Advisory 
Committee is called upon to help resolve any labeling change disputes between FDA and 
a manufacturer.
58  The Pediatric Advisory Committee also has authority to conduct post-
marketing safety review of all therapeutics with pediatric exclusivity and make 
recommendations regarding labeling and additional areas for investigation.
59 
Other specific provisions of BCPA, as well as how it relates to other legislation, 
can be found elsewhere.
60 
(d)  The Pediatric Research Equity Act 
In 2003, Congress passed another law relating to pediatric therapeutics, the 
Pediatric Research Equity Act (“PREA”).  While the BCPA mainly relied on incentives 
                                                 
54 42 U.S.C. § 290b. 
55 21 U.S.C. § 393a. 
56 See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., OFFICE OF PEDIATRIC THERAPEUTICS, 
http://www.fda.gov/oc/opt/default.htm (last visited, May 17, 2008). 
57 Pub. L. 107-109 § 14, 115 Stat. 1419 (2002). 
58 42 U.S.C. § 284m(c); 21 U.S.C. § 355a(i). 
59 Supra note 2. 
60 Lauren H. Breslow, The Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act of 2002: The Rise of 
the Voluntary Incentive Structure and Congressional Refusal to Require Pediatric, 40 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 133-192 (2003).   17 
and structural support to facilitate pediatric research, the PREA allowed FDA to require 
drug sponsors to conduct pediatric research in certain circumstances.
61 
i. PREA’s historical background 
Even before the 1997 Act, FDA was concerned with the nearly universal absence of 
pediatric information for drugs prescribed off-label to children.  In 1994, FDA issued a 
rule requiring manufacturers to adjust their labels to explicitly address whether drugs had 
been tested for safety and effectiveness in children.
62   FDA hoped this would induce 
manufacturers to voluntarily conduct the much needed research in pediatric populations.  
Instead, more than half of the drug labels that were changed simply added the sentence, 
“Safety and effectiveness in pediatric patients have not been established.''
63  Struck by the 
lack of response, FDA proposed a new rule requiring manufacturers to evaluate the safety 
and effectives of any new or currently marketed drug or biological product that is “likely 
to be used in a substantial number of pediatric patients [which FDA set at 50,000] or 
would provide a meaningful therapeutic benefit to pediatric patients over existing 
treatments.”
64  Believing the pediatric exclusion provisions of the 1997 Act insufficient, 
FDA continued the rulemaking process and issued a final rule, known as the “Pediatric 
Rule,” in December of 1998.
65 
  After passage of the BPCA in 2002, the Bush administration suspended the 
Pediatric Rule, letting the incentives of the new law stand alone.  Democratic leadership 
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attacked this move, arguing the importance of the Pediatric Rule in assuring safe 
pharmaceuticals for children, and the Administration subsequently reversed the 
suspension.
66  However, later that year, the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia determined that the Pediatric Rule exceeded FDA’s regulatory authority.
67  
Again, supporters of the Pediatric Rule were outraged, this time asking Congress to step 
in.
68  In response, Congress enacted PREA, essentially codifying much of the Pediatric 
Rule.
69 
ii. PREA’s mechanics 
  Under PREA, all applications to the FDA for a new active ingredient, indication, 
dosage form, dosing regimen, or route of administration must include an assessment of 
“the safety and effectiveness of the drug or the biological product for the claimed 
indications in all relevant pediatric subpopulations.”
70  They must also include 
information that “support[s] dosing and administration for each pediatric subpopulation 
for which the drug or the biological product has been assessed to be safe and effective.”
71  
While PREA only applied to new applications, the provisions were retroactive, meaning 
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it covered any “new” application submitted starting in 1999.
72 
(e) 2007 Reauthorization 
The BCPA and PREA were up for reauthorization in 2007, as both were 
scheduled to sunset in that year.  In the House and Senate committee hearings, the 
“carrot-and-stick”
73 approach the two created received repeated praise from industry, 
patient groups, and FDA – and clamoring calls for reauthorization.  They argued that 
regulatory scheme created by BPCA and PREA has generated invaluable information 
about drugs in pediatric populations, though the lack of information about pediatric 
therapeutics remains staggering.
74  In September of 2007, both laws were reauthorized as 
Titles IV and V of the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007.
75  The 
2007 bill was passed by unanimous consent in the Senate and by an overwhelming 405 to 
7 in the House.
76 
 
2.  The Device Context 
(a) Safe Medical Devices Act 
  As with the general regulation of devices, legislation to induce the development 
of medical devices for the treatment and diagnosis of rare conditions lagged behind and 
generated different regulatory outcomes.  In 1990, seven years after the Orphan Drug Act 
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of 1983, Congress passed the Safe Medical Devices Act.  While the Orphan Drug Act’s 
primary goal was to encourage the production of more “orphan drugs,” the Safe Medical 
Devices Act’s main purpose was to establish a series of post-marketing controls.  Yet, it 
did authorize FDA to adopt special approval mechanisms for devices intended to help 
treat or diagnose very rare conditions, defined as “affect[ing] or…manifested in fewer 
than 4,000 individuals in the United States per year.”
77   
Still, it was not until 1996 that FDA promulgated regulations to effect these 
provisions.
78  Devices intended to for these small populations are called humanitarian use 
devices (“HUDs”), and the special approval mechanism authorized is a humanitarian 
device exception (“HDE”).  Devices with an HDE were exempt from having to 
demonstrate effectiveness during the premarket approval process.  To receive an HDE, a 
drug sponsor only had to show need, safety, and a favorable risk-benefit ratio:  (1) that 
the device would not be otherwise available on the market and no comparable device 
exists, (2) that the device “will not expose patients to an unreasonable or significant risk 
of illness or injury” and (3) “the probable benefit” of using the device “outweighs the risk 
of injury or illness of its use, taking into account the probable risks and benefits of 
currently available devices or alternative forms of treatment.”
79 
The HDE mechanism attempted to reduce the cost of bringing a device to market 
through eliminating the cost of meeting FDA’s regulatory hurdle of showing 
effectiveness.  However, to prevent manufacturers from abusing the new incentives, they 
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were not allowed to make a profit off of their HUDs; they could recoup only “the costs of 
research and development, fabrication, and distribution of the device.”
80  
According to a 2004 FDA report, the agency reviews approximately 5-10 HDEs 
annually.
81  By October 2007, forty-four HDEs had been approved.
82  Of note here, the 
very first device to receive an HDE was a fetal bladder stent, a life-saving pediatric 
device.
83 
The differences between the ways Congress addressed the similar problem of 
small patient populations in drugs and devices here are striking. Orphan drug status can 
be granted to drugs for conditions with less than 200,000 patients, while an HDE can 
only granted to a device for a condition with less than 4,000 patients.  Sponsors of orphan 
drugs are not restricted as to their ability to make a profits, unlike sponsors of HUDs.  
Orphan drugs receive seven years of market exclusivity; HUDs receive no additional 
market exclusivity.  Yet, orphan drugs are subject to the same safety and effectiveness 
standards as other drugs, while HUDs are exempt from showing effectiveness, a lower 
regulatory burden. While some of the differences may speak to the differences between 
the two kinds of medical products, others may speak more to differences in political 
landscape, statutory structure, historical regulatory norms, and legislative priorities. 
(b)  Medical Device User Fee and Modernization Act of 2002 
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In 2002, Congress directly addressed pediatric medical device issues for the first 
time through the Medical Device User Fee and Modernization Act (“MDUFMA”).  
MDUFMA contained many important provisions relating to the regulation of medical 
devices generally, including, as its name suggests, the authority for FDA to collect user 
fees.  MDUFMA’s provisions relating specifically to pediatric medical devices included 
the following.  First, it declared that no user fees could be collected on applications for 
use in pediatric populations.
84  Second, it required pediatric expertise on premarket 
approval panels when appropriate.
85  Third, it gave FDA 270 days to issue guidance 
concerning “the type of information necessary to provide reasonable assurance of the 
safety and effectiveness of medical devices intended for use in pediatric populations;” 
and “protections for pediatric subjects in clinical investigations of the safety or 
effectiveness of such devices.”
86  Lastly, it required FDA to employ the Institute of 
Medicine to conduct a study evaluating the existing postmarket surveillance of medical 
devices used in pediatric populations.
87 
(c) 2004 FDA Guidance 
On July 24, 2003, FDA published a draft guidance document to comply with its 
Congressional mandate.
 88  FDA solicited input from stakeholders through the public 
comment process.
89 
 On May 14, 2004, the agency issued non-binding recommendations, 
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90   
In its guidance document, FDA defined four pediatric subpopulations to guide 
research and labeling of new devices:  (1) newborn or neonate, from birth to one month 
old; (2) infant, older than one month to two years old; (3) child, older than two years to 
twelve years old; and (4) adolescent, older than twelve to twenty one years old.
91  FDA 
also listed several factors for researchers to consider when developing devices and 
planning clinical trials in pediatric populations:  “height, weight, growth and 
development, disease or condition, hormonal influences, anatomical and physiological 
differences from the adult population, activity and maturity level, [and] immune status.”
92   
FDA reaffirmed that its flexible approach to medical device oversight would 
continue to apply in the pediatric context, proposing that “the amount and type of 
evidence” required to demonstrate the safety and effectiveness of a pediatric device 
would depend on an array of device-specific features, including “the nature of the device, 
what is already known about the product in the adult population (if relevant), what is 
known or can be extrapolated about the device to the pediatric population, and the 
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underlying disease or condition being treated.”
93  In some cases, FDA might not require 
clinical trials at all.  In others, adult population data might suffice, perhaps with limited 
supplemental safety data in pediatric populations.  FDA also indicated that for some 
devices, data could be extrapolated from one pediatric age ground to another, while for 
others, FDA might require safety and effectiveness data in every targeted pediatric 
subgroup.
94  To assure appropriate study design, FDA recommended individual sponsors 
discuss their specific clinical trial plans with the FDA reviewing division.
95 
FDA’s guidance addressed labeling specifically as well.  In general, medical 
device labels must include a description of the device; indications, including the target 
populations; contraindications, warnings, and precautions; adverse events; summary of 
clinical trial data; and instructions for use.
96  For devices intended for use in pediatric 
populations, FDA recommended sponsors consider patient size (i.e., “weight, height, 
body mass, or surface area”), the implications of pediatric development and growth, 
variations in body habitus, unique pediatric pathophysiologies, and behavioral and 
psychosocial factors, among other factors.
97 
Finally, FDA reiterated the ethical issues inherent in pediatric research and the 
special protections FDA regulations require.
98  Because children have been identified as a 
particularly vulnerable population for research, FDA reminded sponsors of the agency’s 
already existing regulations outlining the safeguards required for research in pediatric 
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populations.
 Those regulations address issues of “informed consent, assent, permission, 
financial remuneration, direct benefit, and minimal risk.”
 99 
While many patient groups, researchers, and device manufactures commended 
FDA for drafting guidance on pediatric medical devices, the document was not 
universally lauded.  For example, the American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons was 
“concerned about defining all patients greater than 12 years of age to 21 years of age as 
adolescents,” because doing so seemed to brush over clinically important biological 
transitions, such as skeletal maturity, which occurs for females at approximately 14 and 
males at approximately 16.
100 
(d) Medical Devices Technical Corrections Act of 2004 
While FDA was composing this guidance document, Congress enacted a second 
law with provisions addressing pediatric medical devices.  The Medical Devices 
Technical Corrections Act was signed into law in April 2004, one month before FDA 
issued the May 14, 2004 draft guidance document described above.   The explicit purpose 
of the Medical Devices Technical Corrections Act was to “make technical and clarifying 
corrections” to MDUFMA; at least in its Senate Bill form, the new Act left the 
“underlying substance” of MDUFMA “unchanged” and was estimated to cost nothing to 
taxpayers.
101   
Nevertheless, the new law did add a requirement that the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services to provide a report to Congress on why there are so few appropriate 
therapeutic and diagnostic devices for children and what could be done to solve the 
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problem.
102  Congress gave the Secretary 180 days from the enactment of the law to do 
so.
103 By October 2004, FDA generated the Congressionally mandated report,
104 which 
will be discussed below. 
 
PART III 
Again, FDA solicited public comment on unmet medical device needs for 
pediatric populations, barriers to the development of such devices, and ways the FDA 
could better facilitate that development.
105  FDA also incorporated discussions from a 
June 28, 2004 meeting hosted by the American Academy of Pediatrics, the Elizabeth 
Glaser Pediatric AIDS Foundation, the National Organization for Rare Disorders, and the 
National Association of Children’s Hospitals.
106  Here, I will go through those comments 
and discussions to demonstrate the breadth and depth of the current needs, barriers, and 
potential solutions, as articulated by stakeholders. 
1.  Unmet needs 
The needs raised at the June stakeholder meeting fell into three categories:  (1) 
pediatric indications for which no device is available, (2) pediatric indications for which 
an adult device is being used off-label, and (3) pediatric indications for which a device is 
available but does not meet the needs of a specific population.
107  These general 
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categories were also reflected in the public comments FDA solicited from clinical groups, 
health care providers, academic researchers, and medical device manufacturers. As one 
clinician remarked, “most devices which are used in the pediatric/congenital cardiac 
population are used ‘off label’ as ‘hand-me-downs’ of devices approved for humans, but 
only for adult humans.”
108  Even when there are devices designed for children, those 
devices are few and out of date. Texas Children’s Hospital, the largest pediatric hospital 
in the United States, reported the lack of appropriately sized devices and the lack of 
choice among devices that are appropriately size.
109  The American Academy of 
Orthopedic Surgeons lamented “the lack of available innovative products…caus[ing] 
[pediatric orthopedic surgeons] to utilize devices that have been virtually unchanged for 
the past forty years.”
110 
Many commentators evidenced the above issues by describing the concrete needs 
of specific patient groups, from the practices of pediatric cardiology, pulmonology, 
nephrology, orthopedics, and general surgery.
 111  The American Society for Pediatric 
Nephrology (“ASPN”) discussed the lack of sufficiently small catheters for pediatric 
patients with renal failure and volume tubing for children on dialysis; ASPN reported that 
the smallest catheters available were too large for some infants and the smallest volume 
tubing available required too large of a percentage of an infant’s blood to go through the 
dialysis circuit at any given time.
112  As another example, the American Thoracic Society 
highlighted the need for pediatric breathing algorithms for non-invasive positive pressure 
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ventilators; available machines were tailored to an adult inhalation/exhalation cycle, 
which has a different pacing than a child’s.
113 Many clinical groups specifically pointed 
out, again, the acute lack of devices for neonates and infants, as the smallest and most 
vulnerable groups within pediatric populations.
114   
2.  Barriers to developing pediatric medical devices 
Three types barriers were mentioned:  (a) the lack of communication and 
coordination identifying pediatric device needs and potential solutions, (b) the 
technological challenges of creating devices for growing children, and (c) the limited 
profitability of pediatric medical devices. 
(a)  Lack of communication and coordination 
First, researchers, device manufacturers, and clinician groups believed that device 
needs for pediatric patients were going unmet, in part, because of a lack of awareness and 
understanding of those needs.  For example, the American Pediatric Society and the 
Society for Pediatric Research wrote, “the lack of availability of appropriately designed 
and studied pediatric devices appears to be based in part on a lack of understanding of 
need and importance of devices for children.”
115  Both manufacturers and clinical groups 
saw a lack of communication among themselves, in particular, as a key barrier to 
addressing pediatric medical device needs.
116  Without better coordination, the needs 
pediatric clinicians see at the bedside can go unnoticed by those who develop and make 
devices available in the market.  In fact, AdvaMed, an industry group representing 
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manufacturers of medical devices, diagnostic products, and medical information systems, 
who together manufacture almost ninety percent of the health care products purchased in 
the United States, refused to respond directly to FDA’s request for input on unmet needs.  
Instead, AdvaMed called upon pediatric specialty groups, those “involved in the 
treatment of pediatric populations,” to identify, prioritize, and communicate to 
manufacturers the needs they see in their practices.
117   
At least one clinician believed that manufacturers are hesitant to communicate 
with pediatricians or facilitate communication among physicians, because of liability 
concerns.   The off-label use of adult devices in children is not per se illegal, but off-label 
marketing is and can be followed by hefty sanctions.  Thus, if a manufacturer discusses 
with clinicians the pediatric use of a device approved only in adults or a potential 
modification of a device approved only for use in adults, the manufacturer could fear 
being subject to an FDA enforcement action for illegally marketing a non-approved 
product.  As a result, manufacturers shy away from open communication with physicians 
regarding off-label use, “much less supporting educational meetings and/or seriously 
discussing new products.”
118 
(b)  Technological challenges 
Second, manufacturers raised the technological difficulties of developing 
pediatric medical devices, particularly in comparison to adult devices, as a barrier to 
pediatric device development.  These include the limited applicability of devices intended 
for long-term use because of children’s dynamic rate of change in size and shape of 
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anatomy; constraints in choice of materials because of children’s susceptibility to certain 
physical and chemical agents and children’s metabolic and hormonal changes; and 
technical challenges in anticipating the “lifetime burden of exposure to agents.”
119 
(c)  Limited profitability 
Third, and by far the most common barrier mentioned in comments solicited by 
FDA, the limited profitability of pediatric medical devices because of the market size, 
was viewed, also most commonly, as the most serious challenge to their availability.
120  
Again, pediatric populations are small, diverse, and dispersed, particularly in comparison 
to the adult market.  Often, the costs of research and development, manufacturing, and 
distribution cannot be recouped, given the size of the patient base.  In addition to the 
problems identifying needs and the technological challenges – each creating financial as 
well as practical barriers to pediatric device development – several other factors 
exacerbate the limited profitability problem, including:  (i) regulatory requirements, (ii) 
perception of increased liability, (iii) relative impotence of patent protections, (iv) 
reimbursement difficulties, (v) the structure of the medical device industry, and (vi) lack 
of outside funding. 
i.  Regulatory requirements 
Meeting regulatory requirements takes considerable time and money, particularly 
in the pediatric arena.  The American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons complained 
generally about the “complex regulatory burdens on device and product development” 
and commented that manufacturers choose to conduct studies outside of the US to avoid 
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FDA’s burdensome regulatory scheme.
121  One researcher remarked that the 
“disproportionate” amount of time and money spent on the regulatory process stifles 
innovation.
122 
1)  Getting enough human subjects 
Because the patient population for any given pediatric device is small and can be 
“scattered across the country,”
123 investigators have difficulty generating a large enough 
population of pediatric participants to satisfy FDA criteria to conduct a clinical trial.
124  
In other words, “[the] small patient base means it is well nigh impossible to build up 
clinical trial numbers to compare to, say, coronary trials [in adults].”
125  The requirements 
for randomized controlled trials can be particularly difficult.  The Spina Bifida 
Association of America observed that the call for a randomized controlled trial, by itself, 
could create enough of a disincentive to conduct medical device research in pediatric 
patients as to be prohibitive.
126  For example, the need for a placebo arm hinders already 
difficult recruitment, because very few parents are willing to risk their children receiving 
the control.
127 
2)  Time  
A corollary to the difficulty recruiting patients is the length of time needed to 
enroll enough patients to conduct a trial on any single device.  Completing large scale 
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studies like those that are standard in the adult population was characterized as 
“impossible” to do “in a reasonable time frame.”
128  During the lengthy process, devices 
are “frequently” improved, making the device or the procedure easier and safer.  
However, those improvements cannot be incorporated into the ongoing trial; the 
improved device must be subjected to a new trial, at the threat of “severe penalties for the 
sponsor/manufacturer.”
129 
3) Need for multi-center collaboration 
If a device sponsor is willing to conduct the requisite trials, a multi-center 
collaboration is often necessary to find enough patients and do the trial in a reasonable 
amount of time.
130  This raises costs in multiple ways.  First, coordination among centers 
is not free.  Developing trusted relationships among hospitals takes time and resources.  
Second, contract negotiations among the various centers can be expensive.
131  Even with 
multiple institutions on board, it can still take a long time to enroll sufficient patients, and 
the rigidity of the clinical trial model in the face of ongoing, iterative improvement of the 
investigational device is still a barrier.  
4)  Ethical issues with randomized controlled trials 
Some commentators objected to using randomized controlled trials, which they 
perceive as FDA’s gold-standard, arguing that “no knowledgeable and/or moral person 
can require that a child…who happen [sic] to be ‘randomized’ to the ‘short straw,’ be 
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subjected to the additional [mental and physical] trauma and risks of the [control].”
132  
For example, obesity is increasingly prevalent in children, paralleling adults, yet the kind 
of surgery most successful in adults is not well tailored to children.  The manufacturer of 
the device used in that surgery wrote that the best currently available surgery for children 
with obesity is so dangerous that conducting a randomized trial comparing a child’s 
version of the new device to the one in current use would be unethical.
133 
5) Other available data FDA generally does not consider 
Meanwhile, other data exist that FDA arguably could use instead of or as a 
supplement to new trials in the United States.  Those include:  (1) data from small 
independent studies,
134 (2) off-label data, and (3) data from overseas.
135  One can see why 
FDA would hesitate to accept these data; small independent studies and data from 
overseas may not be of sufficiently high standards, and accepting off-label data might 
encourage off-label marketing.   
In addition, some researchers expressed concern over the “potential” for FDA to 
ignore its own guidance concerning the use of literature evidence and population 
evidence in lieu of prospective clinical studies.
136  Regardless of whether FDA would, in 
reality, ignore its own guidance here, the fact that major stakeholders believe the agency 
might suggests, at best, uncertainty about the regulatory requirements, which carries a 
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price tag for companies deciding whether to develop pediatric devices.  At worst, it 
suggests a breakdown in communication and trust between FDA and the individuals it 
serves and regulates. 
6)  Institutional Review Board review 
  One professional association characterized Institutional Review Board (“IRB”) 
review of clinical studies for pediatric devices as “excessively stringent.”
137  More 
common was the concern that IRBs are uncertain about how they should consider 
pediatric devices that have an HDE, namely, whether they should treat HUDs as 
approved or investigational.
138  
7)  The approval process 
The expertise and attitude of FDA officials were criticized, as were the speed and 
standards used for FDA approval.  For example, one researcher wrote that “devices are 
currently often evaluated by people who have so little knowledge about the current state 
of the field that they are paralyzed from effective action.”
139  Another wrote that FDA 
adopts an adversarial and distrustful attitude towards industry, evidenced by threats of 
“extreme” fines and possibly “the destruction of a company” for “perceived 
‘deviations.’”
140 
One manufacturer wrote that while FDA approval takes the same amount of time 
for devices intended for use in children as for adults, the IDE process takes longer 
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because pediatric trials are more expensive to set up and take longer to complete, as 
discussed above.
 141  Other commentators thought FDA added to the length of time with 
“considerable regulatory foot-dragging,” which they perceived to evidence an “[apparent 
fear] to commit to full approvals.”
142  
  Many comments expressed that FDA holds a double standard for children and 
adults.  Possibly because children are viewed as a more vulnerable population, FDA 
requests randomized controlled trials for devices intended for use in children when “no 
such trials may have been required for approval of the indication for adults.”
143  
Comments expressed the belief that FDA overestimates the risk of pediatric medical 
devices and requires more documentation and evidence than it would for a parallel adult 
device.
144  As one manufacturer wrote, “FDA [can emphasize] possible risks, rather than 
known benefits, of technologies already applied to adults, and on restricting access rather 
than working with manufacturers to provide safe but earlier access.”
145   
8)  HDE program 
  Of far greater concern than IRB confusion over how to handle an HDE device 
were the requirements for receiving an HDE.  The 4000 patient limitation and the 
limitation on profit were widely considered “significant disincentives to using the 
program.”
146  Only small volume devices fall into the humanitarian use classification, and 
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without any possibility for profit, manufacturers will not sponsor HUDs, as one 
professional society put it, “absent a corporate display of altruism.”
147 
ii. Perception of increased liability 
Device manufacturers hesitate to conduct research on pediatric populations for 
fear of liability from a bad outcome.
148  Manufacturers worry pediatric device litigation 
would be more emotional and lead to higher awards,
 149 creating financial and 
reputational risk.  One researcher reported that liability insurance can account for 30% of 
the cost of a medical device.
150 The heightened liability risk could extend to health care 
practitioners, institutions, and industry, chilling research.
151  
iii. Relative impotence of patent protections 
Because of the nature of medical devices, patent protections are frequently 
successfully challenged or designed around by competitors.   Device patents are usually 
not held for the device as a whole, but for a particular design attribute or material, making 
it easier for a manufacturer to copy a competitor’s device without infringing on that 
competitor’s patent.
 152  As an illustration, according to one manufacturer, several 
companies hold competing patents on pacemakers – all with the same intended use and 
population.
153  In addition, some devices are frequently improved upon and updated, 
rendering the original patent protection worthless.
154  For example, “new medical surgical 
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devices quickly become obsolete.”
155  As a result, the market exclusivity incentive that is 
so successful in drugs is ill suited to many devices. 
iv. Reimbursement difficulties 
The lack of insurance reimbursement was reported in several comments.
156  First, 
some pediatric patients, such as those with congenital heart problems, are systematically 
underinsured or non-insured.
157  Second, CPT codes do not exist for many procedures 
involving pediatric medical devices.
158  Third, medical device companies are smaller than 
drug companies in general, and thus do not have the resources or expertise to negotiate 
coverage, coding, and payment with every payer.
159  Thus, even when insurance will 
reimburse pediatric use of medical devices, reimbursement is not infrequently below cost, 
causing physicians and hospitals to take an income loss in order to provide them to their 
patients.
160   
These issues are exacerbated by the fact that the confusion seen within IRBs in 
dealing with HDEs is also present among insurers.  Insurers are uncertain whether HUDs 
should be considered approved, and covered, or as investigational, and not covered.
161   
In fact, some insurance companies refuse to pay for humanitarian use devices because 
FDA has not deemed them effective,
162 threatening to defeat the purpose of the HDE 
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regulatory scheme.  One manufacturer summarized this by saying, “reimbursement 
systems have not kept pace with regulatory processes for HUDs.”
163 
iv. Structure of the medical device industry 
As mentioned above, medical device companies are generally smaller than drug 
companies; they are also generally younger and differently structured.  Medical devices, 
compared to pharmaceuticals, have shorter life cycles and lower barriers to entry.
164  
Most device companies are set up to produce one or several particular devices and are 
financed by venture capitalists.  As a result, the risk they can take on is lower than drug 
companies; they do not have streams of profits from other products to off-set the 
heightened risk of developing, researching, and distributing pediatric devices.  The 
“overly burdensome statutory or regulatory mandates can easily overwhelm both the 
financial and human resource capabilities of small device companies.”
165  Even the rare 
large device manufacturer, that has the capital to spend on a pediatric device and the 
stability to take the risks involved, most likely does not have the appropriate facilities to 
produce the small quantities needed for pediatric patients; its facilities are generally built 
to produce large quantities of a device.
166 
v. Lack of outside funding 
One solution to market failures is to provide other, non-market mechanisms for 
funding.  However, there is little available funding for researchers to conduct device 
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research in pediatric populations outside the industry context,
167 at least little that most 
stakeholders seemed aware of. 
 
3.  Recommendations 
  The stakeholders’ recommendations addressed the specific problems they saw by 
drawing upon the current regulatory scheme of devices, the existing regulatory 
mechanisms for pediatric drugs, as well as unique changes targeted at what they viewed 
as unique problems.  Here, I divide those recommendations into recommendations on (a) 
facilitating coordination, (b) improving the regulatory process, (c) modifying clinical trial 
standards, (d) accepting other types of data, (e) creating new positive incentives for 
development, and (f) miscellaneous issues. 
(a)  Facilitating coordination 
Many comments included recommendations to facilitate communication among 
the different players in the medical device field,
 168 particularly between clinicians and 
industry.
169  Some suggested creating and providing continuing support for multi-center 
collaborative networks to ease clinical research, specifically pediatric recruitment.
170  
Others recommended integrating medical devices into the agenda of the OPT and 
PAC.
171  Another idea was for FDA to use the exemption of pediatric devices from user 
fees to generate a system to identify and track the use of devices in children, both on and 
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off-label.
172  “Such a system could be used, for example, for FDA to identify devices that 
require only slight modifications or minimal additional testing to obtain a pediatric 
indication and to communicate the necessary data requirement to the manufacturer.”
173 
(b)  Improving the regulatory process 
In thinking of ways to encourage testing on pediatric populations and 
subpopulations, recommendations looked toward PREA.  Professional societies 
suggested establishing a presumption that all devices with indications in pediatric 
populations, regardless of whether they are manufactured for adults, should be designed 
for and tested in pediatric populations.
174  Like PREA, that presumption would be 
rebuttable, “tak[ing] into account feasibility, ethical and ethical concerns, and the public 
health interest in not delaying the development of devices for adults.”
175  To address the 
lack of incentives for device sponsors to conduct further research in pediatric populations 
once a device is approved, “have device manufacturers pay a portion of profits to fund 
studies on the use of these devices with other medications, or in other age groups.”
176 
  Comments also included recommendations for more subspecialty input in the 
regulatory process.  For example, FDA could assure pediatric cardiac device applications 
are evaluated by pediatric cardiologists, with the idea that individuals of special expertise 
can “reasonably interpret…less clear and voluminous data.”
177  Because of their 
understanding of current practice, special experts may be better suited to 
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“define…criteria for device performance that would at least equal current practice,” 
potentially reducing the level and type of evidence necessary to gain approval. 
178  One 
group even provided a list of organizations of pediatric cardiologists who could be 
willing to provide that expertise without conflicts of interest.
179  
Third, further recommendations aimed at adding clarity and uniformity to the 
regulatory process.  One suggestion was for FDA to fund an independent, centralized 
IRB to reduce the costs of conducting multicenter trials, both in the sheer administrative 
task of bringing a study before several IRBs and in the uncertainty and coordination 
problems when local IRBs vary their specific requirements.
180  Another was for FDA to 
increase predictability by providing more guidance on pediatric submissions, both in 
general
181 and for individual companies trying to determine the likelihood of approval.
182  
FDA was asked to eliminate its perceived double standard between their approval 
processes for adult and pediatric devices.
183 
Fourth, several public comments requested a decrease in the amount of time spent 
during the review process.  Stakeholders expressed frustration with the additional year 
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the premarket approval process can add.
184  For example, the American Academy of 
Orthopaedic Surgeons recommended FDA adopt international consensus standards to 
decrease the net amount of time a device has to spend in premarket review globally.
185  
The device manufacturer Fisher & Paykel Healthcare, Ltd. recommended FDA cut down 
on premarket review time by allowing manufacturers to submit a de novo 510(k) without 
having to go through the NSE Class III determination first.
186 Fisher & Paykel also 
recommended FDA accept online applications for pediatric submissions and provide 
expedited 510(k) review for a fee.
187  In exchange for a more streamlined review process, 
FDA could mandate more rigorous and longer-term post-markteting activities.
188  
Alternatively, or in addition, FDA could use labeling to add caveats to devices that went 
through an expedited review.
189 
Fifth, AdvaMed recommended fast-tracking the coverage decisions by the Center 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) in addition to expediting FDA review.
190  
It also thought that FDA and CMS could provide an incentive similarly powerful to 
pediatric exclusivity in the drug context by expediting the FDA and CMS processes for 
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“the related adult indications of a pediatric device or for the adult indication of another 
device manufactured by the same company when there is no corresponding adult 
indication related to the pediatric device or if the adult device is already on the 
market.”
191 
(c)  Modifying clinical trial standards 
  Several comments addressed ways to alter FDA’s clinical trial requirements, 
including relaxing the required enrollment numbers,
192 developing new standards for 
efficacy,
193 and creating a mechanism for allowing improvements to investigational 
devices without requiring a new study.
194 
Specifically, several comments recommended FDA take a more flexible approach 
to clinical trials for pediatric medical devices, tailored to the specific condition or 
subpopulation.
195  For example, American Academy of Allergy, Asthma, & Immunology 
recommended allowing studies in infants and young children to proceed without placebo 
arms.
196  AdvaMed recommended FDA using its discretion to waive informed consent for 
certain studies.
197  One pediatric cardiologist recommended adopting different process for 
promising new technologies for extremely rare heart defects.
198   
It is interesting to note here the tension between the benefits of flexibility, 
tailoring premarketing approval to each specific device, condition, and affected 
population, and bright-line rules, which add simplicity, uniformity, and predictability.  As 
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previously mentioned, FDA’s approach to regulating medical devices is flexible, 
certainly more flexible than its approach to regulating drugs.  Yet stakeholders’ 
comments indicate they believe FDA’s premarket approval scheme for pediatric devices 
both lacks sufficient simplicity, uniformity, and predictability, and lacks sufficient 
flexibility. Given the wide variety of recommendations on both, it is not surprising that 
regulatory solutions that best balance the two are not obvious. 
(d) Accepting other types of data 
One device manufacturer based in New Zealand requested FDA more readily 
accept trials from the European Union, Canada, Japan, and other developed countries 
with “recognized” regulatory controls for medical devices, and work with device 
sponsors to design their international trials according to FDA requirements.
199  Other 
device manufacturing groups recommended FDA utilize historical data, published data 
from off-label use, and clinical data from patient files
200 when the patient population is 
prohibitively small, along with “appropriate safeguards to ensure against abuse by 
manufacturers.”
201 
(e) Creating new positive incentives for development 
i.  Mimicking the Orphan Drug Act 
A minority of comments wanted Congress to extend the regulatory scheme of the 
orphan drug act to pediatric medical devices.
202  However, the orphan drug incentives 
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work largely because of the effectiveness of the patent extension, a regulatory lever that 
would probably not work, at least not as uniformly well, in the device context.
203 
ii.  HDE improvements 
Many stakeholders gave recommendations for improving the HDE program.  The 
most popular recommendation was to lift the profit restriction for HUDs intended for use 
in pediatric patients.
204 AdvaMed recommended lifting the restriction on the required 
number of patients as well.
205  Note, however, that this would mean that device 
manufacturers would never have to prove effectiveness for devices intended for use in 
children, at least not during the premarket process.  Some organizations had more modest 
proposals, such as allowing manufacturers to collect profits on devices exceeding 
$250,
206 and increasing the threshold number of patients to some unspecified number.
207 
  iii.  Financial incentives to industry 
Many comments argued that providing manufacturers with financial incentives to 
invest in researching, designing, and producing pediatric devices could be effective.
208  
The American Thoracic Society suggested Congress consider creating grants or providing 
guaranteed loans to small companies for the research and development of pediatric 
devices.
209  It also recommended Congress provide financial support for developing 
prototypes and conducting clinical trials through a network.
210  Other comments 
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recommended tax credits to manufacturers,
211 an incentive used in the drug context, as 
discussed above.  Some stakeholders here thought tax credits should be applicable to any 
research a manufacturer conducts associated with pediatric devices.
212   
Several reinforced the importance of the exemption from user fees that sponsors 
submitting devices applications with pediatric indications currently enjoy.
213  One 
manufacturer recommended FDA reduce user fees for all medical device submissions, 
arguing that any added fees are resources that could be spent on pediatric innovation.
214   
iv. Financial incentives to non-profit organizations 
The representative from Boston Children’s Hospital recommended Congress 
provide product development funding to programs like Boston’s own Pediatric Product 
Development Institute (“PPDI”).
215  PPDI, and programs like it, ideally engage in risky 
early stage development, where a company may be less likely to get involved, and then 
partner with companies to take promising ideas to market.
216  One academic suggested 
providing funding for innovative investigators “with breakthrough ideas who may not 
have a “research track record.”
217  AdvaMed recommended increased funding from 
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relevant institutes of the NIH for the research and development of specific medical 
devices.
218 
v.  Identifying current sources of funding and suggesting others 
One manufacturer believed it would be helpful for FDA to identify existing grant 
programs to help link pediatric device researchers who need funding with funding 
sources.
219  In doing so, FDA could suggest new programs to Congress if those it 
identifies are not sufficient.
220 
(e)  Miscellaneous issues 
Comments touched on several other issues, including off-label use, liability, and 
reimbursement. 
i.  Off-label use 
Relating to the comments that off-label use was the rule rather than the exception, 
recommendations included remarks that allowing these devices to be used off-label is 
“essential.”
221  On a less extreme end, device manufacturers requested more guidance on 
the consequences of using or advertising a device off-label in the pediatric context.
222  
ii. liability 
Most comments did not provide recommendations about liability concerns, and 
one even stated that improving the problems associated with liability concerns is “not 
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feasible…[because you can’t take] lawyers out of the equation.”
223  Nevertheless, one 
manufacturer did suggest using legislation to reduce the liability risk associated with 
pediatric medical devices.
224 
iii. Reimbursement 
In the same vein as the recommendations that CMS speed its review of pediatric 
medical devices, comments recommended engaging insurance companies to more rapidly 
approve the reimbursement of pediatric devices.
225 
Manufacturers also cautioned against requiring pediatric labeling for devices 
because of the potential effect on reimbursement.  Requiring pediatric labeling could 
render the pediatric use of devices on the market with general labeling of-label, and thus 
ineligible for reimbursement.  This could both hurt patients directly, by reducing the 
affordability of those devices, and indirectly, in the form of lost revenues by 
manufacturers who then have less capital to invest in new research and development 
opportunities.
226  In addition, AdvaMed warned that required labeling could put device 
manufacturers out of business because of the additional data or testing for pediatric 
indications that labeling for those indications would require.  Again, fewer manufacturers 
could translate into fewer devices available for pediatric patients.
227 
 
PART IV 
1.  FDA’s Report to Congress 
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In FDA’s October 2004 report to Congress, which summarized the comments it 
received, FDA refused to make any concrete policy recommendations.  “HHS 
conclude[d] that it is premature to recommend any substantive policy changes, including 
administrative and legislative changes.”
228  Notwithstanding the detailed comments FDA 
received by knowledgeable stakeholders, FDA determined that “the complexity of the 
issues and the wide range of perspectives” compelled them to call for “further study…to 
determine the scope of unmet needs, the potential barriers to bringing new pediatric 
devices to market, and the most promising solutions to addressing these unmet needs.”
229 
 
2.  The Institute of Medicine’s Report 
The Institute of Medicine (“IOM”) generated a 457 page report on the adequacy 
of postmarketing surveillance of medical devices used in pediatric populations.
230  
Postmarketing surveillance includes activities to understand the safety and effectiveness 
of medical devices already on the market, through post-market testing or adverse event 
reporting, and the steps taken to respond to any safety concerns revealed.
231  The goal of 
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FDA’s postmarketing surveillance efforts, according to IOM, should be to create an 
“objective, trustworthy, and effective” program that balances eliminating unsafe devices 
on the market with promoting innovation and stimulating product improvement.
232 While 
this paper has focused on premarketing regimes, the IOM report was influential in the 
subsequent Congressional action.
233 
At the time IOM issued its report, FDA had in place few postmarketing activities 
uniquely addressing at the pediatric use of medical devices.
234  IOM noted several deficits 
in FDA’s approach to postmarketing surveillance, both for devices in general and for 
pediatric population use in particular, and provided corresponding recommendations.  
IOM characterized FDA’s monitoring of postmarketing studies and the lack of public 
access to their findings and methods as “the most obvious deficits in FDA’s 
performance.”
235 IOM was also struck by the lack of FDA authority to hold premarket 
clearance conditional on a commitment to postmarket study, especially because clearance 
is a lower premarket bar.   In addition, IOM noted that FDA was only authorized to 
require postmarket study for up to three years.  In thinking about the pediatric population, 
this could be too soon for developmental consequences of a particular device used in 
children to manifest.
236  Other observations of IOM included the “incomplete or 
inaccurate” adverse event reporting and the lack of a centralized point of responsibility 
within FDA to handle pediatric medical device issues.
237   
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IOM generated eighteen recommendations.
238 Some recommendations were for 
FDA internally; some were directly for industry, professional, academic, or patient 
groups, or a combination of those; many were for collaboration and coordination among 
FDA, other government agencies, and industry, professional, academic, and patient 
groups; and some were for Congress.  For example, IOM called upon FDA establish a 
centralized point of responsibility within the Center for Devices and Radiological 
Health
239 to address pediatric issues.  It also called upon “children’s hospitals and other 
user facilities” to establish similar centralized points of responsibility for monitoring and 
responding to device safety concerns.  As another example, IOM recommended FDA 
promote the development and uptake of a common device coding system to help link data 
on use and outcomes.
240  As a third example, IOM suggested FDA collaborate with NIH, 
the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (“AHRQ”), and “other research funding 
agencies and interested parties” to develop “a research agenda and priorities for the 
evaluation of the short-and long-term safety and effectiveness of medical devices used 
with growing and developing children.”
241   
IOM made two recommendations specifically to Congress.  First, it called upon 
Congress to mandate FDA create a system for monitoring and publicly reporting relevant 
information about postmarket studies.
242  Second, it recommended Congress allow FDA 
to require postmarket studies as a condition of clearance on certain categories of devices 
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and allow FDA discretion to require postmarket studies beyond three years when 
appropriate.
243 
 
3.  Medical Device Innovation Initiative 
Meanwhile, in May 2006, before Congress acted on the above recommendations 
and reports, FDA announced the Medical Device Innovation Initiative.  Recognizing the 
rapid advance of technology and the corresponding potential for “medical devices that 
will challenge existing paradigms and revolutionize the way treatments are 
administered,” FDA decided to launch an initiative to facilitate this innovation and 
update its review process for such devices.  While this initiative was not focused on 
pediatric medical devices, FDA did mention devices for pediatric populations as the 
kinds of innovative devices the initiative would address.
 244   
 
PART V 
1.  In the House and Senate 
On March 8, 2007, Democratic Senator Chris Dodd from Connecticut introduced 
S. 380, the Pediatric Medical Device Safety and Improvement Act of 2007.  This 
legislation set out to both improve incentives for the development of devices for children 
and provide FDA with greater authority to assure the safety of new devices once on the 
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245 On March 13, Congressmen Edward Markey, a Democrat from Massachusetts, 
and Mike Rogers, a Republican from Michigan, introduced companion legislation in the 
House.
246  Congressman Markey likened the need for pediatric medical devices to car 
seats:  “Just as kids need car seats in the car while adults are fine with seat belts, kids 
need medical devices that are designed to work for them and keep them safe.”
 247 
On March 27, 2007, Senator Dodd chaired a Health, Education, Labor and 
Pensions (HELP) Committee hearing entitled, “Ensuring Safe Medicines and Medical 
Devices for Children.”  The hearing addressed the reauthorizations of BCPA and PREA 
in addition to the new Pediatric Medical Device and Improvement Act.  As often happens 
when drug and device legislation are considered together, the drug provisions seemed to 
have taken the limelight.  Of the five individuals testifying before the committee, only 
two mentioned the Pediatric Medical Device and Improvement Act. The House’s Energy 
and Commerce Subcommittee on Health held a similar hearing “on Programs Affecting 
Safety and Innovation in Pediatric Therapies.”
248   The bills seemed, at least from the 
public statements of members of the House and Senate reviewed for this article, to have 
been well-supported.  By September of 2007, the House version was incorporated into 
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the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, along with BCPA and 
PREA.
249  As previously stated, the legislation passed easily in both chambers. 
 
2.  The Mechanics of the Act 
Informed by FDA’s 2004 report, recommendations from the IOM, and its own 
hearings, Congress used the new act to create several modifications to the pre-existing 
regulatory scheme for pediatric medical devices.  First, it required the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services to track and report new devices used in pediatric populations, 
mandating that certain device applications and protocols include the number of pediatric 
patients affected with “the disease or condition that the device is intended to treat, 
diagnose, or cure” and a description of the targeted pediatric subpopulations.
250  Second, 
it expressly permitted FDA to accept adult data to “support a determination of a 
reasonable assurance of effectiveness in pediatric populations” and to extrapolate data 
from one pediatric subpopulation to another, when appropriate.
251  Second, it lifted the 
prohibition against making profits on HUDs when they are intended for use in pediatric 
populations and labeled for use in pediatric patients.
252 Third, it required FDA to issue 
guidance for IRBs on evaluating HDE applications.
253  Recall that each of these was 
widely recommended by public stakeholders.  Congress also provided that the 
Comptroller General assess the impact of lifting the ban on making profits off of HUDs 
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intended for use in pediatric populations, and submit a report with that assessment to the 
House and Senate by January 1, 2012.
254  
Fourth, a twist on one of IOM’s recommendation to FDA, Congress gave the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services, in consultation with FDA, NIH, and AHRQ, 
180 days to present Congress “a plan for expanding pediatric medial device research and 
development,” including improving FDA’s clearance and approval processes for pediatric 
medical devices and evaluation of their short- and long-term safety and effectiveness.
255  
Fifth, in response to nearly universally articulated concerns over coordination and lack of 
outside funding, Congress authorized $6 million per year for the next four years to go 
towards demonstration grants to nonprofit consortia to “facilitate the development, 
production, and distribution of pediatric medical devices.”
256  Those consortia are to 
coordinate with NIH and FDA, and each must provide an annual report to the Secretary 
of Health and Human Services.
257  Sixth, Congress required FDA to “designate a contact 
point or office to help innovators and physicians” find funding sources for research on 
pediatric medical devices, mirroring one of the public comments.   And, picking up on 
the recommendations of multiple stakeholders, Congress expressly included medical 
devices as part of the purview of the Office of Pediatric Therapeutics and the Pediatric 
Advisory Committee.
258 
  Finally, Congress followed IOM’s advice and gave FDA the authority to require 
postmarket surveillance as a condition of approval or clearance for certain devices and to 
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order postmarket surveillance for certain class II and class III devices, and to order, when 
“necessary,” over 36 months of postmarket surveillance for devices that are “expected to 
have significant use in pediatric populations.”
259 
 
3.  Congress’s Policy Choices 
  Given all the viewpoints discussed in this paper, it does seem that the 
Congressional action picked up on most of the largest themes addressed by many 
individuals in many sectors.  While I will not go through each observation and 
recommendation here to show which were incorporated and which were not, I will 
highlight certain policy choices embedded in the new law and discuss their potential 
impact. 
First, Congress refrained from increasing the size of the patient population 
necessary for a device to qualify for an HDE.  Many stakeholders, particularly in industry 
and research, recommended policy makers remove what they perceived as an “arbitrary” 
line.
260 However, few, if any, stakeholders who recommended increasing the cap named a 
larger number that would be less arbitrary.  As previously mentioned, some stakeholders 
wanted the limitation to be eliminated.  Still, Congress could have set the number at the 
same number for orphan drugs, 200,000 patients.  This number may be arbitrary as well, 
but there could have been an applicable rationale for its use in the drug context.  Perhaps 
Congress believed eliminating the prohibition on profits would provide sufficient 
incentive without increasing the patient cap, or perhaps it wanted to see what lifting one 
restraint would do to the market before lifting another.  It should be remembered that 
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orphan drugs are not exempt from the effectiveness requirement, and so perhaps 
Congress felt more comfortable having a higher limit in that context, where children are 
not being exposed to devices whose effectiveness has not been shown.   This illustrates a 
main tension of the HDE scheme, balancing the importance of making devices available 
against assuring those devices are effective. 
  Second, Congress decided to enhance non-market funding for devices solely 
through appropriating grants for non-profit consortia, and not through providing direct 
financial aid to industry, as some industry representatives would have liked. While it 
might not be surprising that Congress felt more comfortable funding non-profit 
organizations than for-profit ones, it may be surprising that Congress did not require 
those consortia to coordinate with industry, but only with FDA and NIH.  Perhaps policy 
makers believed they were already “funding” industry through allowing them to make a 
profit off of HUDs.  Because of the possibility for profit, industry should have the 
incentive to make itself informed of any promising devices or ideas for devices that the 
consortia may develop.  However, given the common complaint that industry currently 
lacks mechanisms for linking with non-profit research and clinicians, and the fact that 
pediatric devices are not large profit-makers, it remains to be seen how well idea-
exchange will flow between the non-profit consortia and device manufacturers.  While 
Congress did require FDA to provide a point person to help “innovators” identify 
funding, this is not the same as creating a mechanism for those who practice medicine or 
conduct research to interact with those who can manufacture and produce those devices. 
Similarly, the “plan for expanding pediatric medical device research and 
development,” mandates that the Secretary of Health and Human Services coordinate   58 
with FDA, NIH, and AHRQ.  While many stakeholders, and the IOM, recommended the 
development of such a plan, most explicitly recommended non-government stakeholders 
should be involved. For example, AdvaMed was adamant that clinicians should help 
define the priorities for pediatric medical devices, since they know what their patients 
most need. Even IOM recommended a slew of non-government actors that should be 
brought to the table.  Here, not only was industry left out, but so were clinicians, patient 
advocates, academics, professional organizations, and other non-profit entities.  
Perhaps Congress believed the Secretary would involve at least some of those 
stakeholders anyway and wanted to leave the particular groups to the Secretary’s 
discretion.  Perhaps Congress believed that the public comment process FDA facilitated 
in order to generate its congressional report and Congressional public hearings provided 
sufficient non-government input, or that the government employees at FDA, NIH, and 
AHRQ include sufficient representation from at least some of those stakeholder groups.  
Perhaps because of the short time-frame on delivering the plan, Congress did not want to 
overburden the secretary by forcing the involvement of more viewpoints.  Yet, Congress 
could have simply extended the time-frame.
261 
  Fourth, the Congressional authorization to require a commitment to postmarketing 
study as a condition of approval or clearance is similar to what was recommended by 
some industry players.  Yet, it was explicitly argued against by the Medical Device 
Manufacturers Association when the bill was being considered by the Senate: 
                                                 
261 Perhaps the law’s authors wanted to see results quickly and move forward on solving 
the problem, thinking that even if the plan is not the very best, FDA, NIH, and AHRQ 
together are sufficiently informed and capable to produce a plan that is very good.  Or, 
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“By permitting FDA to “condition” approval or clearance on postmarket surveillance, 
FDA could prevent a manufacturer from marketing a device, for its approved or 
cleared indications, until the manufacturer agreed to conduct potentially burdensome 
and expensive studies on unapproved pediatric uses of the device.  As a result, the 
[provision] may deter manufacturers from developing medical devices that may have 
a potentially significant pediatric use.  A manufacturer may decide during the initial 
approval or clearance process, to contraindicate its device for use in pediatric 
populations to avoid being subject to burdensome and costly postmarket 
surveillance.”
262      
 
Hopefully, FDA will not use its new authority to require “burdensome and expensive 
studies;” indeed, as mentioned above, FDA is only authorized to require those studies 
when “necessary.”  Yet one can assume that this new requirement would create a 
disincentive to produce pediatric devices, first because of the added expense of the 
required trials and second because of the potential uncertainty over whether a given 
device’s approval or clearance will be subject to such a commitment.  The size of the 
disincentive is unclear; it could be negligible.  Nonetheless, the project of device, and 
drug, regulation, particularly for small markets, is to balance assuring a device or drug is 
safe and effective with providing sufficient profit incentive to developing helpful, and 
potentially life-saving, devices and drugs.  Where to fall on that balance is a difficult 
policy choice, and, as seen throughout this paper, setting the incentives accordingly can 
be even more challenging.  MDMA here argues that some devices will not be produced 
with this extra regulatory burden, and it may be right.  Yet, it is also true that FDA, and 
the public, could have a greatly increased understanding of which devices on the market 
are helpful, which ones are dangerous, which require monitoring, and which need further 
study. 
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Lastly, the particular tracking mechanism Congress chose is interesting.  It is 
simple to implement, but is likely not as robust as what IOM had in mind for 
postmarketing surveillance.  This tracking mechanism could help FDA and Congress see 
what kinds of new devices are becoming available for children over time, and it may help 
identify which conditions and which subpopulations, if any, are receiving more or less 
attention by manufacturers.  Importantly, it could also help gauge the impact of future 
Congressional or regulatory action.  For example, if Congress did choose to increase the 
size of the patient population for which an HDE can be granted, any subsequent increase 
in the volume of pediatric devices going to market could be observed.   However, the 
tracking mechanism cannot, by itself, identify areas where there is underdevelopment or 
overdevelopment of devices.  In other words, it cannot provide a normative baseline to 
compare the numbers it generates; it cannot tell Congress where the numbers should be.  
Moreover, because the tracking mechanism is being put in place along with the other 
potentially market-altering initiatives Congress passed in this act, it cannot directly track 
their impact.  For example, the impact of the $6 million appropriation for research cannot 
be measured using this mechanism, because corresponding numbers from before the 
appropriation was granted are not available.    
Nevertheless, given the relatively low implementation cost of the tracking system, 
the amount of information it can provide, even just for measuring the impact of future 
initiatives, is likely worthwhile. 
 
4.  Regulatory Actions So Far 
  On October 10, 2007, FDA established an internal committee to deal with pediatric   61 
medical device issues, the Pediatric Review Committee (“PeRC”).
263  FDA was 
scheduled to issue guidance for IRBs on the evaluation of HUD applications, as Congress 
mandated, on March 3, 2008.
264  However, there appears to be no evidence this was done, 
at least from the guidance available on the FDA website.
265  As far as the research plan 
Congress mandated, the Secretary placed NIH at the lead, so FDA is currently 
“supporting” NIH in that endeavor.
266  From FDA’s public information, it seems this plan 
is also yet to be completed.
267 
 
5.  A Final Comparison to Drugs 
  Because of historical differences in regulation and because of differences in the 
kinds of things devices and drugs are and the characteristics of the industries that produce 
devices and drugs, the regulatory schemes for encouraging the development of drugs and 
devices for pediatric populations are also different.  Both require post-market surveillance 
and both are now linked under the same coordinating office at the FDA.  While the drug 
regulations rely primarily on market exclusivity, the device regulations provide 
incentives through reducing premarket regulatory hurdles.  Both use federal funding to 
support research, at least among non-profit researchers, though drug regulation provides 
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more financial incentives to industry.  
  Here, my project is not to show whether drug regulation is better or more 
appropriate than device regulation, or the other way around.  Instead, I hope to show how 
a similar problem of pediatric innovation has been addressed in two different ways, how 
the two schemes have evolved over time, and how the different regulatory tools and 
incentives chosen affect the other kinds of tools and incentives required to achieve the 
policy goal.  Similarly, through the description of the public comments in the device 
context, I hoped to demonstrate that different stakeholders who agree on the goal – here, 
of increasing availability of pediatric devices – can have differing, but more often similar, 
views on how to achieve a policy end.  In addition, through an in depth discussion of the 
stakeholder views and the subsequent legislation, I aimed to provide a sense of the 
breadth and complexity of the issues and an illustration of how Congress addressed that 
complexity through generating a set of new provisions. 
    It remains to be seen how the Pediatric Medical Device Safety and 
Improvement Act will work towards achieving its goals.  The problem of pediatric 
markets is a difficult one, raising interesting questions of which legislative and regulatory 
levers best achieve the policy goals, given the realities of the industries, health care 
system, and patient populations in need. 